COMMENTS
Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose
The successful operation of the adversary system as a fact-finding
device depends on the capacity of each adversary to present evidence
favorable to his case and to rebut the evidence of his opponent. In
criminal cases, perhaps the most significant disparity between the
government's capacity to prosecute and the defendant's capacity to
defend derives from the government's vastly superior ability to discover information concerning the alleged crime, to conduct investigations that the defense, in most cases at least, has neither the resources
nor the investigative tools to duplicate.1 It might be possible to reduce
this disparity by providing public defender programs with the resources
necessary to locate evidence favorable to the accused. A more efficient
remedy, however, since it does not involve costly duplication of investigative efforts, isto place the results of government investigations
in the hands of the defense.
In Brady v. Maryland,2 the Supreme Court held that the criminal
defendant has a constitutional right of access to some of the information
in the prosecutor's files. The decision left open a number of questions
concerning the nature and extent of this right: whether the defense
must request the information; at what point in the criminal process
the information must be disclosed; and what constitutes suppression.
Most importantly perhaps, the Brady decision failed to define the
standard to be used in deciding what evidence must be disclosed to the
defense or to deal with the problem of enforcing the duty that it imposed on prosecutors. This comment examines the cases that have followed, interpreted, and expanded the rule announced in Brady and
examines their responses to these questions. It concludes that the courts
have, on the whole, been too much concerned with attempting to determine whether the suppressed evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial, and too little with the central inquiry required by
Brady's rationale: whether the defendant has been accorded a fair trial
1 Brennan, J., The CriminalProsecution:Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 279, 286; Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-98 (1960).
2 873 U.S. 83 (1968).
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under the due process standard. It suggests that in light of both the fair
trial rationale of Brady and the state interests involved in our criminal
justice system, the prosecutor's entire file should, except in special
cases, be open to defense inspection.
I.

THE Brady RuLE

The origin of the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable to
the defense is usually traced to Mooney v. Holohan,3 in which a radical
labor leader convicted of first degree murder applied for a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that he had been convicted through the use of
manufactured physical evidence and testimony that the prosecutor
knew to be fraudulent.4 The Supreme Court, in affirming the denial of
the writ on procedural grounds, found in dicta that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct was inconsistent with the concept of a fair trial
and constituted a denial of due process. 5 Seven years later, in Pyle v.
Kansas,6 the Court reaffirmed and broadened the principle it had expressed in Mooney, proscribing the knowing use of perjured testimony
and the "deliberate suppression" of evidence favorable to the accused.
In Pyle, as in Mooney, the Court reasoned that the prosecutor's misconduct had deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair
trial and thus rendered his conviction void. In two subsequent cases,
the Court extended its holding in Pyle, ruling that defendants had been
denied due process where the perjury7 of a witness had been known to
3 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
4 After an extensive review of the evidence in the Mooney trial and the facts surrounding the case, the report of the Section on Lawless Enforcement of the Law to the Wickersham Commission concluded, among other things, that:
Witnesses were produced at the trials with information in the hands of the prosecution that seriously challenged the credibility of the witnesses but this information was
deliberately concealed.
Witnesses were permitted to testify at the trials despite such knowledge in the possession of the prosecution of prior contradictory stories told by those witnesses, as to
make their mere production a vouching for perjured testimony.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, MOONEY-BILLINGs REPORT 24243 (1931) (submitted to, but not released by, the Commission).

5 294 U.S. at 112-13. The Court, citing earlier due process cases dealing with irregularities in the conduct of trials, focused on the notion that the alleged conduct of the prosecutor would render the judicial proceedings a "pretense of a trial" that would fail to meet
due process standards. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309 (1915); see Holmes's dissent in Frank: "Whatever disagreement there may be as to the
scope of the phrase 'due process of law,' there can be no doubt that it embraces the
fundamental conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be heard." Id. at 347.
6 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
7 Pyle involved allegations both of perjury and suppression, which can of course be two
sides of the same coin: the knowing use of false evidence can be considered a suppression
of its falsity ( a fact favorable to the defense), and favorable evidence may be suppressed in
order to conceal the falsity of perjured testimony.
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the prosecutor but not suborned by him, and where the evidence was
relevant only to sentencing8 or to the credibility of a prosecution witness9 rather than directly to the defendant's guilt.
In all of these cases, the Court focused on the conduct of the prosecutor; the central inquiry was whether the defendant had been denied a
fair trial because of the improper role played by the prosecutor in obtaining his conviction. The Third Circuit's decision in U.S. ex rel.
Thompson v. Dye'0 marked a departure from the Pyle line of cases both
in rationale and in application. Finding a denial of due process in the
suppression of testimony that could have corroborated the defendant's
exonerating claim of intoxication, the court ignored any issue of the
prosecutor's blameworthiness and, instead, dealt only with the effect of
the suppression on the defendant's ability to present his defense. The
court held that whether the prosecutor's conduct had been willful or
merely negligent, his failure to communicate favorable evidence had
deprived the defendant of a fair trial. In a subsequent case, the Second
Circuit applied the Thompson approach to the negligent suppression
of evidence in the hands of government officials other than the prosecutor." In both Thompson and in the Second Circuit's decision, the
focus was thus not whether the prosecutor had behaved improperly,
but, rather, whether the defendant lacked access to information possessed by the government that could have changed the outcome of
his trial.
In Brady v. Maryland,'2 the Supreme Court finally spoke directly to
the issue of prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused and ratified the development of the fair trial concept that had
8 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); see United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195
F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
9 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
10 United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955).
11 United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961); cf. Kyle v.
United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964). But see Johnson
v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1967): "An interesting question is raised as to whether
'the prosecutor' is chargeable with the suppression of evidence for which the sheriff of
another county of the state, apparently having no connection with the prosecutor, is
responsible." Id. at 681.
12 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady was involved with one Boblitt in a robbery-murder and
was convicted and sentenced to death. The prosecutor turned over to the defense all but
one of Boblitt's statements to the police that the defense had requested. In the withheld
statement, a retraction of an earlier one, Boblitt admitted that he had strangled the victim.
The Maryland Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on the question of punishment only
because under the felony murder rule Brady was guilty of murder no matter who did the
killing. The Supreme Court held that Brady had not been denied a federal right in the
restriction of the subject matter of the new trial. For a thorough exposition of the history
and facts of the case and the life of John Leo Brady, see R. HAMMER, BzrwEEN Lira AND
DF-ATH (1969).
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taken place in the lower courts: "We now hold that the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."13 The Court said that the unfairness, and hence the violation
of due process, inherent in the suppression of material exculpatory
evidence stemmed from the prosecutor's role in helping to "shape a
trial that bears heavily on the defendant."1 4 The Court thus stressed
both the affirmative duty of the prosecution to ensure that criminal
trials are fair and the harm caused defendants when prosecutors fail
to meet this obligation.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE: PosT-Brady DEVELOPMENTS
The Supreme Court's decision in Brady left unanswered important
questions about the extent of the rule it announced and the procedure
by which it was to be applied. Lower courts, and the Supreme Court
itself, have encountered these problems in a variety of cases since
Brady; their responses have often been inconsistent, not only with
each other, but also with the due process concept of a fair trial upon
which the Brady rule is premised.
A.

Necessity of a Request

In Brady the defense had requested the suppressed evidence; the
Supreme Court's holding, read literally, applies only to evidence that
the defendant has asked the prosecutor to disclose. 15 Nonetheless, several courts have held that a defense request is not a prerequisite to
the operation of the Brady rule. 16 Recently, however, in Moore v.
Illinois," the Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the request
13 SS U.S. at 87.
14 Id. at 88.
15 Justice Schaeffer of the Illinois Supreme Court, in his dissent in People v. Moore,
42 M11.
2d 73, 89, 246 N.E.2d 299, 209 (1969), affd in part, rev'd in part, 408 US. 786 (1972),
expressed his opinion that the Court in Brady had simply "used language appropriate to

the decision of the case before it," and had not intended to impose a request requirement.
16 E.g., Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); United States
ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, $26 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964); see Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (reversal in absence of a request); Comment, ProsecutorialMisconduct: A National
Survey, 21 DEPAUL L. Rav. 422, 435-42 (1971). Indeed, the Supreme Court has itself reversed a conviction in the absence of a request. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
Justice Brennan noted in his plurality opinion that the trial court had "ordered a new
trial, despite the absence of a pretrial request of defense counsel for disclosure of the
evidence suppressed." Id. at 73. Justice Fortas, concurring, would have expressly removed
the request requirement: "I see no reason to make the result turn on the adventitious circumstance of a request." Id. at 102.
17 Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
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element in its holding in Brady,' although it did not decide whether
a request is indispensable in all cases.
The basic argument for requiring a request stems from the central
due process criterion of fairness and, in particular, from Brady's attention to the conduct of the prosecutor. It is simply more unfair for the
prosecutor to fail to produce evidence that has been specifically requested than to fail to produce evidence of his own accord. Thus, although they have not ruled that a request is indispensable, two circuits
have held that, in the absence of a request, the defense must make a
stronger showing of materiality 9 than it would had the request been
made.2 0 As the Second Circuit explained, a defense request for specific
information can serve "the valuable office of flagging the importance
of the evidence for the defense and thus imposes on the prosecutor a
duty to make a careful check of his files." 2' 1 In close cases, therefore, the
fact that the prosecutor has failed to disclose requested evidence that
the defense believes to be material may lead the court to conclude that
the trial was unfair even though the requested information would in
fact have been of only marginal utility to the accused.
The "flagging" function described by the Second Circuit would not,
of course, be served by a general request for all material favorable
evidence. Such a request would merely remind the prosecutor of his
constitutional duty,22 and would be little more than a sterile formalism.
At the same time, however, if the defendant is unaware of the existence
of evidence, he may be unable to make a specific request for its production. 23 The defendant may not know, for example, that the state
had conducted tests on physical evidence or that an eyewitness not
called to testify at trial had stated that the defendant was not present
18

The Court said that "[t]he heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution's suppres-

sion of evidence, in the face of a defense production request .... Important, then, are (a)

suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense ...." Id. at 794. The dissenters argued that in fact there had been a request and therefore did not reach the issue
of its necessity.
19 For a discussion of the materiality requirement, see text at notes 66-92 infra.
20 See Clarke v. Burke, 440 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972);
United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138
(2d Cir. 1968); Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961); cf. Levin v. Clark, 408
F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., dissenting).
21 United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1968).
22 Sometimes, apparently, this may be necessary. See Panel Discussion-Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 501 (1967) (remarks of Jon Newman, former United States
Attorney for Connecticut), discussed note I11 infra.
23 Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). This argument has
also been made in Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); and
2d 73, 89-90, 246 N.E.2d 299, 306 (1969) (Schaeffer, J., dissenting);
People v. Moore, 42 Ill.
cf. Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
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at the scene of the crime. To hold a request indispensable would allow
the prosecutor to suppress even evidence crucial to the defense so long
as the defense was unaware of it. And since a defendant's knowledge
of the existence of allegedly suppressed evidence is not readily susceptible to proof, it would be futile to require a request only when the
defendant knows that the evidence exists.
It seems, therefore, unreasonable to make the request an indispensable element in the application of the Brady rule; the harm to the
defendant, and hence the unfairness of the trial, may remain whether
a request has been made or not. In practice, despite the Supreme
Court's reiteration of the requirement in Moore, the great majority
of courts seem to have taken this view, 24 and judicial repetition of the
request requirement may, in fact, only be intended to emphasize the
desirability of a request whenever feasible.
B.

Timing of Disclosure

The decision in Brady did not define the point in the proceedings
against the defendant at which the prosecutor must disclose favorable
evidence. Lower courts have generally divided between two alternatives: pretrial disclosure and disclosure at trial.2 5 Disclosure at the
time of sentencing2 6 or after the charge to the jury2 7 of material that
could have been of use at trial has been held too late.
In responding to this question, the critical inquiry must be what is
required in order to ensure a fair trial. As one court has noted, if evidence is to be of any use to the defendant at all, it must "be made
available to him far enough in advance of trial to allow him sufficient
24 See authorities cited note 16 supra. Contra, United States ex rel. Felton v. Rundle,
410 F.2d 1300 (Sd Cir. 1969) (en banc). In Felton, the trial judge told defense counsel he

could recall the witness if necessary but denied him the opportunity to examine a relevant
police report. The majority stressed that the attorney replied, "Very good, sir" to this
denial; that is, he failed to object. Judge Biggs's dissent points out that the report would
have been valuable to the defendant in itself, as well as to "open up other lines of inquiry
to Felton's counsel." Id. at 1806. Thus the recall opportunity was an inadequate substitute.
25 Favoring pretrial disclosure: United States v. Bonnano, 480 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970). United States v. Trainor, 428 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1970); United
States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Partin, 820 F. Supp. 275 (E.D.
La.), appeal dismissed, 423 F.2d 556 (1970); United States v. Cullen, 805 F. Supp. 695
(E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 454 F.2d 886 (1971); cf. Hamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 890 (4th Cir.
1967). Holding Brady limited to cases of suppression at trial: United States v. Moore, 489
F.2d 1107 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Condor, 423 F.2d 904, 911 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 958 (1970). ABA STANDARDS RELATING To DiscovERY AND PROCEDURE BFORE TRIAL,
§§ 2.1(c), 2.2(a) call for disclosure "as soon as practicable following the filing of charges
against the accused." ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCnON AND THE
DEFSE FUNTIMON § 3.11 specifies disclosure "at the earliest possible opportunity."
28 United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 819 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1968).
27 Hamric v. Bailey, 886 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1967).
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time for its evaluation, preparation and presentation ...."28 Certain
kinds of evidence-for example, some impeachment evidence-may be
of use to the defendant only at trial. But most evidence is valuable for
pretrial preparation. The questioning of favorable witnesses may lead
to the discovery of material evidence. Weaknesses in the prosecution's
case can be exploited through research. Any favorable evidence may
be strengthened by corroboration discovered by means of additional
investigative work. In short, the whole theory and presentation of the
defense may be revised. Because of the multiple uses to which defendants can put disclosed information in preparing their defense, pre2 9
trial disclosure seems the desirable alternative.
30
Although few courts have ruled directly against pretrial disclosure,
appeals based on belated disclosure have generally failed. Some courts
have avoided the timing problem either by holding that the defendant
had not been prejudiced by the delay81 or that he had failed to sustain the burden of proving prejudice.3 2 If, however, a defendant has
been denied evidence until trial, it may be difficult for him to use the
evidence to conduct the investigations and research necessary to establish that the denial was prejudicial. In recognition of this, and to
clarify the duty of the prosecutor, courts should find error in any delay
in disclosure, holding the error harmless and affirming the conviction
83
only when it is convinced that delay had no prejudicial effect.
A particularly difficult timing problem arises when evidence subject
to disclosure under Brady is also subject to the Jencks Act provision
28 United States v. Partin, 320 F. Supp. 275, 285 (E.D. La. 1970). See also Hamric v.
Bailey, 486 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1967). United States v. Cullen, 805 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Wis.
1969); United States v. Ball, 49 F.R.D. 153 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
29 Where there is specific reason to fear witness intimidation or attempted fabrication,
or the court determines that the policy behind the Jencks Act's prohibition warrants a
delay, some compromise in the form of the Jencks Act provision in section 5500(c), incorporating the right to a reasonable continuance, could be required. For the text of section
3500(c), see note 88 infra.
S0 See cases cited note 25 supra.
31 United States v. Jordan, 399 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1968).
32 United States v. Elmore, 428 F.2d 775 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970).
(Prosecutor had met pretrial motion for Brady disclosure with a denial that he had such
evidence, but then disclosed some at trial. Denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial was
affirmed due to failure to request a continuance and court's conclusion that he had sufficient time to make use of the evidence at trial.); United States v. Trainor, 423 F.2d 263 (Ist
Cir. 1970) (Defendant's claim that all Brady material must be disclosed before trial was
rejected. The court said it would require pretrial disclosure where necessary in fairness
to the defendant but held that since the information, a witness's prior statement, was
useful to the defense only for the purpose of impeachment and could have been of
no help in pretrial preparation, the delay in disclosure required by the Jencks Act was not
prejudicial.)
83For a discussion of harmless error in Brady rule cases, see text at notes 92-95 infra.
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requiring that past statements of government witnesses not be disclosed
until they have testified at trial.3 4 If Jencks Act statements contain
material evidence favorable to the accused, and if the Brady rule is
read to require pretrial disclosure, the statute and the rule conflict.
Some courts have held that statements of government witnesses need
never be disclosed until the Jencks Act permits.35 Others, although approving the Jencks Act requirement in general, have held that evidence
so "obviously exculpatory and of such a nature that delay in disclosure
would prevent the defendant from effectively using it at trial" must
be turned over before trial; if it is not, the court may grant a motion
for a mistrial.30 Only one appellate decision has dealt with this conflict
between the Jencks Act and the Brady rule. In United States v.
Trainor,37 the First Circuit denied relief to the defendant, but at the
same time it clearly implied that if the statement in question contained
material useful to the defendant at the pretrial stage, the prosecutor's
failure to disclose at that time would have required reversal.
Defense counsel are perhaps most likely to encounter problems when
the prior statement of a prosecution witness contains evidence useful
to the defense at the pretrial stage but unrelated to the witness's trial
testimony. The provisions of the Jencks Act deny such statements to
the defense altogether. If the in camera inspection that the Act calls
for3 8 fails to alert the judge to the significance of the statements, defense
34 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970): "(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States,
no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be
the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct
examination in the trial of the case. (b) After a witness called by the United States has
testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the
United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the
possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness

has testified .. "
38 United States v. Wolfson, 289 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
437 F.2d 862 (1970); United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D 4. (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
36 United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
37 423 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1970).
38 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1970): "If the United States claims that any statement ordered to
be produced under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter
of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such
statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall
excise the portions of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of
such statement to the defendant for his use ....
Whenever any statement is delivered to
a defendant pursuant to this section, the court, in its discretion, upon application of said
defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be
reasonably required for the examination of such statement by said defendant and his
preparation for its use in the trial."
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counsel may have to argue on appeal, citing Trainor, that insofar as
it denies the defendant access to information that must be disclosed
under the Brady rule, the Jencks Act is unconstitutional.3 9
C. Who Decides What Is Favorable
Brady did not specify whether the defense, the trial judge, or the
prosecutor was to determine what information in the prosecutor's file
is favorable to a defendant and of sufficient materiality that disclosure
is required. If the defense were allowed to make this determination,
complete disclosure of the prosecutor's files would of course be necessary. No court has required this procedure, and many have expressly
rejected arguments that Brady requires it.40
Most courts have also rejected the alternative of in camera inspection by the court,41 usually on the ground that it is impractical in terms
of judicial economy. It has also been pointed out that general in camera
inspection could raise the possibility of judicial bias in cases in which
the same judge inspected the file and tried the case.4 2 In addition to
these objections, allowing the court to make this determination might
well prove unsatisfactory to the defense since, pretrial and in the trial's
early stage, a judge is probably less likely than a prosecutor to be able
to identify what evidence can be considered favorable to the defendant's
case.
While judicial inspection of the entire file is unusual, courts have
agreed to inspect specific material to determine whether it must be disclosed. In several cases in which the defense had requested grand jury
43
testimony and had either been told that there was nothing exculpatory

or been given excerpts and told that nothing else was favorable,

trial

39 See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969), on Brady-Jencks problems.
There may also be some implicit conflict between Brady and the Court's decision in
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); see United States v. Russ, 362 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 923 (1966).
40 United States v. Evanchik, 413 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Harris, 409
F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Avella, 395 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1968). For a discussion

of this possibility, see text and notes at notes 108-35 infra.
41 United States v. Frazier, 394 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Cobb, 271 F.
Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Scalf v. Bennett, 408 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1969) (where,
after defendant alleged suppression had occurred, trial judge, and on appeal the circuit
court, searched record and found none); Hensley v. United States, 406 F.2d 481, 485 (10th
Cir. 1968) (holding that, while it was error for trial judge to delay examination of
prosecutor's files until after trial, fact that he found no Brady material indicated defendant
was not prejudiced.)
42 See Panel Discussion-Discovery in Criminal Cases, supra note 22, at 499 (remarks

of Jon Newman, former United States Attorney for Connecticut).
43 Pollard v. United States, 441 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1971).
44 Xydas v. United States, 445 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
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judges have inspected the testimony to determine whether the prosecutor had fulfilled his disclosure duty.45 In Xydas v. United States,48
the inefficacy of this procedure was demonstrated by the postconviction
discovery that the testimony examined by the trial court did indeed
contain statements favorable to the accused.
The courts' rejection of both defense and court inspection of the
prosecutor's file leaves one alternative: it is the duty of the prosecutor
to police himself, to remain alert for aspects and implications of
evidence that might be favorable to the accused, and to make disclosure
on his own initiative. The prosecutor is, perhaps, best able to assemble
and transmit the evidence in the government's possession. But because
this duty forces the prosecutor into a role that is, to some extent at
least, in conflict with his major task of pursuing convictions, it is
necessary for the courts to assess his performance in light of the underlying goal in Brady-ensuring a fair trial for all defendants-and to
impose sanctions when his performance is inadequate. 47 Although the
courts have assigned to the prosecutor the burden of determining
what material must be disclosed to ensure a fair trial, he must exercise
this function from a defense perspective, 48 and it may be unrealistic
to suppose that an adversary can act with the objectivity this requires.
D.

What Constitutes Suppression

The conduct that Brady termed "suppression" can better be called
nondisclosure. The latter term lacks the connotation of intention in the
former and, therefore, more accurately reflects the case law development. The movement of cases from Mooney to Brady has been analyzed
as a change from a focus on the willful misbehavior of the prosecutor
to a focus on the harm to the defendant. 4 Comparison of the suppression cases to the similar but distinct line of cases concerning newly
discovered evidence demonstrates, however, the importance of the
prosecutor's conduct in the constitutional fair trial concept.
Newly discovered evidence is not favored as a basis for a new trial; 0
45 But see United States v. Eustace, 423 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970), in which the trial court's
refusal to undertake even such a limited inspection was affirmed.
46 445 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). The defendant's conviction

was affirmed on the ground that the favorable statements were immaterial.
47 For a discussion of the prosecutor's role, see text at notes 93-107 inIra.
48 See Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir. 1964); Griffin
v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950): "Where there is substantial room for
doubt, the prosecution is not to decide for the court what is admissable or for the defense
what is useful."
49 Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant,
74 Y AE L.J. 136 (1964); see text at notes 3-14 supra.
50 United States v. De Marie, 261 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1959).
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to secure a new trial, the defendant must generally show that, because
of the newly discovered evidence, the trial would probably result in
his acquittal.5 1 The standard of materiality applied under the Brady
rule is clearly not this high:. something less than the probability of a
different result suffices.52 The only difference between the newly discovered evidence cases and the Brady cases that can account for this
difference in treatment is that, in the latter, the government knew of
the existence of the evidence. Thus, a defendant cannot obtain a new
trial if there is only a possibility that newly discovered evidence would
lead to his acquittal; nor can he obtain a new trial if he has failed to
exercise due diligence in uncovering evidence that probably would
have led to his acquittal.5 3 In the Brady cases, however, the courts see
greater unfairness, and therefore require a much lesser showing of
harm, apparently because the unavailability of the evidence resulted
from the action or inaction of the state.5
In addition to this perceived difference in the degree of unfairness
to the defendant, newly discovered evidence cases and nondisclosure
cases present very different problems for the administration of justice.
Criminal defendants will always have an incentive to attempt to dis51 United States v. Martinez, 436 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 959
(1971); United States v. Craft, 421 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1970). The general rule is stated
in Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851):
Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz: that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to
his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence
that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would probably produce
a different verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only
-viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That
the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for.
And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to
impeach the character or credit of a witness.
While the Berry rule is usually followed, an alternate and more liberal formulation, said
to be applicable only in cases of recantation by a witness, United States v. Johnson, 327
U.S. 106, 111 n.5 (1946), was enunciated in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th
Cir. 1928), which held that a new trial should be granted because of newly discovered
evidence when "without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion."
52 See text at notes 66-92 infra.
53 Cf. United States v. Passero, 290 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 819
(1961). While this is theoretically true under the Berry rule, courts can either find due
diligence or avoid the rule if the likelihood of acquittal on retrial is great.
54 Newly discovered evidence and suppression cases differ in other respects as well. Impeachment evidence, which will not generally suffice in the former, may warrant reversal in
the latter. Compare United States v. Craft, 421 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1970) and Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968) with Napue
v. Illinois, 360 US. 264 (1959) and Ingram v. Peyton, 867 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1966). The
"merely cumulative" doctrine, which is a substantial bar to reversal in the former, United
States v. Dam, 429 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1970), has been less significant in the latter. See text
and notes at notes 82-84 infra.
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cover an additional shred of evidence that might arguably have made
a difference at trial. So long as defendants have been accorded fair
trials, with the opportunity to discover and present evidence, the
problem for courts is to preserve the finality of judgments and prevent
constant retrials in all but exceptional cases. Suppression of evidence
can be avoided, however, only if the courts define clear standards for
disclosure and impose sanctions whenever these standards are breached.
Although suppression need not be intentional, courts have generally
expected some showing that the prosecutor has been negligent, that
there was reason for him to believe that the evidence might be useful
to the defense. This requirement is correlated, at least in part, to the
materiality standard. If the prosecutor was aware of certain evidence
but unaware that it was favorable to the accused, the materiality of the
evidence-and the negligence of the prosecutor-may seem doubtful; 55
by the same token, if the evidence is obviously important, prosecutorial
negligence can be assumed. A defendant may be harmed by the nondisclosure of any favorable evidence, but whether this harm is of constitutional significance and renders the trial unfair may depend on the
standard of negligence that the courts set for prosecutors: if the
standard of negligence is high, the required showing of materiality may
be correspondingly low.
Some recent cases indicate that the standard of care imposed on
prosecutors may be quite high. The Supreme Court has held that
although the loss of Jencks Act statements does not automatically equal
suppression, the government must show that it has made a good faith
effort to preserve them.5 6 The District of Columbia Circuit has ruled
that "before a request for discovery has been made the duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of preservation." 57 In some circumstances,
55 The evidence could, of course, be very useful: The defense might have information
which, together with something in the prosecutor's file, could prove crucial, but without
this defense information, the prosecutor could well be unaware of the importance of his
own information to the defense. This possibility supports the argument for complete disclosure. See text at notes 108-35 infra.
56 United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
57 United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971). On remand, 331 F. Supp.
927 (1971), and reappeal, 448 F.2d 1182 (1971), it was determined that the agent had indeed
been negligent in the loss of a recorded conversation that the defendant had a right to
have disclosed under Brady, the Jencks Act and FED. R. Canm. P. 16. The court said that,
although reversal would normally be required, the tape was apparently garbled and inaudible and of no practical use to the defendant. This, combined with the strong evidence
against the defendant, outweighed the error of the loss and warranted affirming. On the
specific problem of destruction of evidence, a form of suppression with its own special
problems since favorability and materiality can no longer be determined, see Comment,
Judicial Response to Governmental Loss or Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. Cim. L. REV.
542 (1972).
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the prosecutor may be required to take affirmative action to secure
evidence favorable to the accused. One court has suggested, for example, that the failure of the prosecutor and investigating officers to
conduct investigations that could reveal exculpatory information might
constitute suppression. 58 A similar issue arises when the prosecution
refuses to offer immunity to a prospective witness whose testimony
would clearly be relevant and probably favorable to the defendant.5 9
Although the government may in many cases have good reason to avoid
granting immunity, if his testimony is likely to be crucial to the defense
and if the witness is not under indictment in connection with the
matters that his testimony would concern, the prosecution's refusal
60
to obtain the testimony seems tantamount to suppressing it.
To constitute suppression, the government must at one time have
possessed the evidence or at least had access to it;61 the prosecutor,
58 See Peoples v. Hocker, 428 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970), in which defendant's murder
conviction was upheld in an appeal alleging suppression by the police in failing to take
paraffin tests for gunpowder to determine if the deceased had committed suicide. The
court's rationale was not that the police have no duty to seek evidence for the defense,
but that, although the tests might better have been performed, the investigation was not
so poor as to constitute a denial of due process. In this case, as in many suppression cases,
the overwhelming weight of the evidence against the defendant may also have contributed
to the result.
59 See Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967), which held that refusal to grant immunity did not constitute suppression (at least
where the offer would probably not have induced the testimony anyway). The court split
four to four on a motion for rehearing en banc. It is clear that suppression constitutes
keeping evidence from the defendant for use in connection with his trial. Failure to
present evidence favorable to the defendant to the grand jury is not grounds to quash
the indictment for suppression even though, had the evidence been offered, the indictment
might not have been returned. Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1968).
60 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 6003, providing that the United States Attorney may request the court
to confer immunity to obtain testimony in certain cases when, in his judgment, the testimony of the witness "may be necessary to the public interest." When the government declines to do so, an alternative remedy to appellate reversal for suppression would appear
to be a missing witness instruction by the trial judge. Such an instruction would inform
the jury that the government's failure to obtain the testimony raises a presumption that
it would be favorable to the defense. See Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893);
McAbee v. United States, 294 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 882 U.S. 854 (1965);
Richards v. United States, 275 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 815 (1960). Such
an instruction would, however, encourage the prosecutor to gamble that the jury would
presume little, particularly where the witness's testimony was strongly favorable and
material. In such a case it would be especially important that the testimony be obtained
and the stronger sanction of reversal might be necessary to prod the prosecutor to do so
through an offer of immunity.
61 See Peoples v. Hocker, 428 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970). A prosecutor's warning to an
important witness not to talk to defense counsel has been held to be suppression of the
means of obtaining evidence and close enough to actual suppression of evidence to support
the reversal of a conviction. Gregory v. United States, 869 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966); cf.
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964): "A
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however, need not have possessed the evidence so long as it was in the
custody of other government agents. The suppression of favorable
documents by government agents, 62 a favorable ballistics report known
to the police, 63 and a policeman's knowledge that a witness is giving
false testimony64 have all been held chargeable to the prosecution.
Thus, under the Brady rule, the government is treated as an entity
and the knowledge of any government agent may be imputed to the
prosecutor. 5
E.

"[W]here the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment .... "

The most difficult problem created by the Brady decision has been
that of materiality. Although the Court's use of the term "material"
could at the time have been taken to mean only that the evidence must
be relevant, lower courts, and the Supreme Court itself in subsequent
cases, have read into the word a standard for the degree of harm that
the suppression must have caused the defendant to require the reversal
of his conviction. Perhaps because of the myriad fact situations in
which suppression claims can arise, courts have found it impossible
to define a materiality standard of general applicability.
Materiality, as it is used in the Brady cases, has two components.
The first is the extent to which the evidence is favorable to the accused.
If, for example, one of only two eyewitnesses to a crime had told the
prosecutor that the defendant was definitely not its perpetrator and
if this statement was not disclosed to the defense, no court would hesitate to reverse a conviction resting on the testimony of the other eyewitness. But if there were fifty eyewitnesses, forty-nine of whom identified the defendant, and the prosecutor neglected to reveal that the
other, who was without his badly needed glasses on the misty evening
of the crime, had said that the criminal looked something like the
defendant but he could not be sure as he had only had a brief glimpse,
the result might well be different. The second component of the
materiality standard is the relevance of the evidence to the issue of
defendant has hardly had a fair trial if he has been denied the opportunity to discover
evidence or information crucial to his defense."
62 Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961).
63 Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
64 Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 630, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 865 (1970). This may be true even when the policeman is not present in the
courtroom when the testimony is given. See Luna v. Beto, 391 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1967).
65 See text and note at note 71 supra. But see Johnson v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677 (8th Cir.
1967), discussed note 11 supra.
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the defendant's guilt or innocence. 66 Eyewitnesses' reports would clearly
be relevant;6 7 evidence that the defendant would not have used at
trial but that would have secured him a procedural advantage might
not be relevant. 68 Both of these factors-favorability and relevanceare, however, so difficult to measure that the courts, instead of dealing

with each separately, attempt to answer, in light of all the evidence,
the conclusive question: Would disclosure of the evidence in question
have changed the outcome of the trial? The difficulty involved in mak-

ing this decision, which is in any case necessarily based on hindsight,
is exacerbated by the fact that the trial may have been distorted by
the defendant's inability to use the suppressed evidence to prepare.
The three suppression cases that the Supreme Court has taken since
Brady have not clarified the materiality standard. In Giles v. Maryland,69 the Court reversed a rape conviction on the ground that the
prosecutor had failed to disclose that the prosecutrix had retracted

another rape charge. Perhaps because of the importance of this evidence, the majority was able to decide the case without reference to
an explicit standard of materiality;7 0 whatever the standard, the evidence was material.
Giglio v. United States71 dealt with the materiality of a statement
of the key prosecution witness; the assistant United States attorney who
66 The reversal, in one case, for the suppression of evidence relevant only to the impeachment of a prosecution witness represented an extension of the doctrine since it was
not directly material to guilt. Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1966); cf. Napue v.
Illinois, 360 US. 264 (1959).
67 See Weaver v. United States, 418 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1969); Lee v. United States, 388
F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1968).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Teague, 445 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1971) (defendant convicted
of bank robbery on eyewitness testimony held not prejudiced by prosecutor's failure to
disclose eyewitness to almost simultaneous robbery of nearby postal substation); Flores v.
United States, 379 F.2d 905, 910 n.6 (5th Cir. 1967).
69 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
70 The opinions did discuss whether suppression of inadmissable evidence could warrant reversal. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Douglas joined, made contradictory statements on the subject, both implying that
it could, ("the defense might have made effective use of the report at the trial or in obtaining further evidence." Id. at 74) and, by implication, that it could not ("whether the
prosecution's constitutional duty to disclose extends to all evidence admissable ...." Id.
at 74). Justice Fortas responded in his concurrence, "I do not agree that the State may be
excused... solely because of a conclusion that they would not be admissible at trial....
No respectable interest of the State is served by concealment of information which is
material, generously conceived, to the case, including all possible defenses." Id. at 98. This
issue has not been directly presented on appeal but it is hard to believe that the suppression of an important exculpatory statement would not warrant reversal merely because
it was hearsay. For cases concerning the pretrial use of suppressed evidence, see cases cited
note 25 supra.
71 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for a unanimous court.
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presented the case to the grand jury knew that the statement was false,
but the trial attorney, who left the statement uncorrected, did not. In
describing the materiality standard, the Court said, quoting the Napue
decision, that "[a] new trial is required if 'the false testimony could...
in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury
...."72 The Court did not further clarify the test. But since the Court
concluded that the suppressed evidence would have severely undermined the credibility of the witness on whose testimony the prosecution's case almost entirely depended, a precise articulation of the materiality standard was perhaps unnecessary to the decision. As in Giles,
reversal would have been required under almost any standard.
In Moore v. Illinois, 8 an extremely complex murder case, the
Supreme Court again failed to articulate a standard for judging the
materiality of undisclosed favorable evidence. Moore was convicted on
the eyewitness testimony of two persons and the corroborated testimony
of one Sanders that he had heard Moore boast of the crime. Moore's
defense was alibi and mistaken identification; he presented one witness
to an incident involving the murderer and the victim that had occurred
just before the crime, who testified that Moore was not the criminal.7 4
The major items of evidence suppressed were Sanders' original statement to the police identifying the speaker as "Slick" and other evidence
showing that "Slick" and Moore could not have been the same man.
The Court affirmed the conviction, the majority concluding that
"Sanders' misidentification of Moore as Slick was not material to the
issue of guilt," and that "the background presence of the elusive
'Slick,' while somewhat confusing, is at most an insignificant factor." 75
Only the dissent made any attempt to describe the standard by which
materiality must be measured: "While frivolous information and useless leads can be ignored, if evidence is clearly relevant and helpful to
the defense, it must be disclosed." 76 The dissenters concluded, quoting
Justice Schaefer's dissent in the Illinois Supreme Court, that had the
suppressed facts been available to it, " 'the jury may well have been
72

Id. at 154; see text and note at note 9 supra.

73 408 U.S. 786 (1972), a five-to-four decision with Justice Marshall's dissent joined by

Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Powell. Justice Brennan's vote, and particularly his silence,
is surprising in light of his expressed views on this subject. See Brennan, J., supra note 1.
74 The link between this incident and the murder was never conclusively established.
Although one prosecution witness identified Moore both times, all parties involved in
the case assumed the two were the same person.
75 408 US. at 797-98. It is too early to assess the effect of this holding, but a decision
by the Supreme Court that the proven misidentification of defendant by a prosecution
witness was not material to guilt in a case in which the crucial factual issue was identification, does not augur well for the extension of defendant's disclosure rights.
76 Id. at 809.
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unwilling to act upon the identifications of [the other two main prosecution witnesses].' ,,77
In a murder trial with conflicting eyewitness testimony and a defense
of alibi and mistaken identity, it seems, at the very least, questionable
to hold immaterial evidence that an important prosecution witness
had mistaken the defendant for someone else. The Court's majority
focused on the question of Moore's guilt and concluded that the suppressed evidence did not destroy the prosecution's case.78 But this does
not answer the necessary due process inquiry: Was Moore accorded a
fair trial? The question should have been whether Moore's attorneys
might have put the evidence to use in preparing or presenting their
client's case. If so-and the conclusion seems inescapable that they
could have-"the State's nondisclosure denied the defendant the
79
fundamental fairness guaranteed by the constitution."
Lower court opinions often read as if the judge has first made up his
mind as to the defendant's guilt and then simply decided the materiality issue accordingly. In one case, for example, in which the government failed to inform the defense of evidence that other strange
vehicles and men in addition to the defendant had been seen near a
bank on the night of the robbery of which the defendant was accused,
the court held that the evidence was immaterial, given the strong,
though circumstantial, evidence of the defendant's guilt.8 0 In another
case, in which the defendant on a rape charge was misinformed by the
prosecution as to the results of a psychiatric examination of the
victim, the district court found that "the jury would not have reached
a different verdict had the report been disclosed." The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding the nondisclosed evidence immaterial.81
Id. at 806.
"The attempt to identify Moore as 'Slick' encountered difficulty, but nothing served
to destroy the two-witness identification of Moore as Zitek's assailant, the three-witness
identification of Moore as present at the Ponderosa Tap, the two-witness identification of
77
78

Moore as one of the men who requested and obtained a ride from the Ponderosa in Dolton
to Harvey, Illinois and Fair's testimony as to the admission made on that ride." Id. at 798.
This assertion is extremely questionable: the misidentification by Sanders cast grave
doubt on the identifications made by the others at the Ponderosa, and in connection with
the ride, since none of them knew "Slick" as well as Sanders did and they were thus more
likely to make a mistake in identification.
79 People v. Moore, 42 Ill. 2d 78, 88-89, 246 N.E.2d 299, 808 (1969) (Schaeffer, J., dissenting), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 408 U.S. 726 (1972).
80 Peterson v. United States, 411 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1969).
81 Stout v. Cupp, 426 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1970). The defendant's confession, which survived
attack in the same appeal, probably influenced the court's speculation as to the effect of
the nondisdosed evidence on the jury. See Lessard v. Dickson, 894 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1968)
(failure to tell defendant that motel operator saw stranger, not defendant, go into deceased's room shortly before body was found, held not material in light of the massive

1972]

Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose

Courts that have affirmed convictions have not generally indicated
how much more convincing the nondisclosed evidence would have to
have been to have warranted reversal. It is possible to construe an
absolute finding that the jury would not have reached a different
result as implying that if there is any doubt whatever about the effect
that the nondisclosed evidence would have had on the jury, a new trial
must be ordered. It is unlikely, however, that this is the implication
the courts intended. Rather, such speculation about effect on the jury
seems often to mean only that the court believes the defendant guilty
and therefore assumes that a jury would agree.
It has frequently been stated that evidence that is merely cumulative does not justify reversal.8 2 A finding that evidence is cumulative
is, clearly, simply another way of denying the usefulness of the evidence
to the defendant. It may be, however, that an accumulation of evidence
3
could have an effect on the jury even though a single item did not;
it is impossible to know what quantum of evidence would have changed
the jury's conclusion. In addition, evidence that seems merely cumulative may come from a source that the jury might find uniquely believable. 84 The "merely cumulative" doctrine often amounts to little
more than a speculative conclusion about the effect on all jurors of an
entire category of evidence. This is, perhaps, preferable to the appellate
court drawing its own conclusion as to the defendant's guilt, but it is
weight of evidence against defendant); US. v. Tomaiolo, 378 F-2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967) ('evidence wholly lacking in probative force because of its speculative quality'). But see
Hamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1967) (evidence is material if it would be mere
speculation to say that it could not have influenced the factfinder).
82 This doctrine was probably first brought to suppression cases from the Berry v.
Georgia rule for newly discovered evidence, see note 51 supra, in Justice Fortas's otherwise expansive concurring opinion in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 100 (1967): "If it has
in its exclusive possession specific, concrete evidence which is not merely cumulative or
embellishing... the State is obligated to bring it to the attention of the court and the
defense." See Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971);
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 410 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1969); Luna v. Beto, 395
F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1968) (en banc); cf. 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIca § 33.03 (1), for the
use of the "merely cumulative" doctrine in motions for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. While this standard may be desirable when dealing with true newly
discovered evidence cases, it seems inappropriate when the evidence is newly discovered by
the defense but was known all along by the prosecution. For a comparison of the
newly discovered evidence and suppression cases, see text and notes at notes 50-54 supra.
83 Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 410 F.2d 807, 312 (3d Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
84 Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1971). The district court's order of new
trial was reversed on the ground that the evidence was merely cumulative. The disputed
evidence was a policeman's recorded suspicion that the prosecution witness in this sodomy
case was a male prostitute. The defense had already presented this theory through another
witness but would no doubt have been eager to have the idea reach the jury through a
policeman.
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nonetheless an objectionable departure from the proper constitutional
question of the fairness of the trial. Whatever standard of materiality
is imposed, it seems particularly improper to hold suppressed evidence
immaterial simply because it can be termed "cumulative."
Judge Friendly has been the leading proponent of a multiple
standard of materiality. 85 In cases in which the suppression was a
deliberate obstruction or failure to disclose obviously valuable information, the evidence is "almost by definition ...

highly material."8 6 In

cases in which the defense has made a request-presumably for specific
evidence rather than all favorable information-the prosecutor is forewarned that the defense considers the evidence important and has a
duty to make a careful check of his files. 87 In both kinds of cases, if
suppression has occurred, Judge Friendly would reverse almost automatically. In a third kind of case, however, in which the suppression
was not deliberate and no request had been made, but "hindsight
discloses that the defense could have put the evidence to not insignificant use,"8 8 Judge Friendly would impose a much higher standard of
materiality. 89 This three-tiered approach to the materiality problem
takes into account the two components of the fair trial concept in
Brady: usefulness to the defense and the conduct of the prosecutor.
If, however, the prosecutor is to have the task of selectively disclosing
favorable evidence from his files, it is unfair to the accused not only
85 United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968); Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d
507 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964); see Link v. United States, 352 F.2d
207 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966), holding that suppressed impeachment evidence requires a higher standard of materiality than would be imposed
for evidence directly relevant to guilt. This may merely mean that because impeachment evidence is inherently less relevant, it must be correspondingly more favorable to require reversal. The court proposed a very liberal materiality standard for evidence directly relevant to guilt: "Evidence material to guilt is, we think, evidence which
is of probative character on that question." Id. at 212. But see Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S.
28 (1957), on the irrelevance of distinguishing impeachment evidence.
86 United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1968). While this is obviously true
for crucial information like Boblitt's confession in Brady or the existence of a favorable
eyewitness, it is not as dear for all cases of deliberate obstruction. It is possible that the
prosecutor could deliberately withhold information of questionable value and that the
conviction would be affirmed on the ground that it would not have raised a reasonable
doubt in the minds of the jury.
87 Id.; see text at notes 20-21 supra.
88 Id.
89 Accord, Clarke v. Burke, 440 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039
(1972); United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967). This standard is left undefined
in Keogh. Compare United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.)
(conviction reversed, in the absence of a request, because of "significant chance that the
new evidence could have induced reasonable doubt') with United States v. Bonnano, 430
F.2d 1060 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970) and United States ex rel. Fein v.
Deegan, 410 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1969) (evidence held not to warrant reversal under Keogh.)
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when the prosecutor deliberately suppresses evidence, but also when
he does so negligently. A standard of negligence based upon the welltrained prosecutor who is conscientiously trying to ensure the fairness
of the trial must be imposed to overcome the hindsight problem and
to ensure that all useful evidence is disclosed.
The standard of materiality under the Brady rule remains a difficult
problem. The evidence in Brady, as in Mooney and Pyle, was of the
utmost importance to the defendant. Many of the lower court cases have
applied the Brady rule to the suppression of less crucial evidence, 90 or
have declared that the rule would be so applied. 91 Attempts to articulate
the materiality standard have generally come from courts reversing
convictions on Brady rule grounds; their usual import is that if there
is even a slight chance that a new trial would result in acquittal, the
defendant's conviction must be reversed. 92 This expansionist trend,
however, may have suffered a severe setback because of the Supreme
Court's highly restrictive approach in Moore.
III.

RATIONALES FOR R EVERSAL AND THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR

Under the present Brady rule framework, whether evidence must be
disclosed depends, not on its value to the defense insofar as this can
be ascertained, but on whether an appellate court will conclude that
the evidence might well have altered the verdict. The court must decide
the materiality of evidence in the light of developments at a trial in
which the lack of evidence may have hampered the defense in ways
90 United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969) (although defendant possessed
abundant material to impeach government's principal witness, new trial ordered for failure
to reveal his pretrial hypnosis and questioning by prosecutor); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d
1209 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (grand larceny conviction reversed where prosecution negligently
failed to reveal that bank teller did not recall changing $1,000 bills for $20 bills); United
States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967) (prosecution gave defense incorrect name of
physician who examined alleged kidnap victim for bodily harm; conviction reversed although defense never followed up the information); Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.
1968) (conviction reversed for suppressed psychiatric opinion of insanity where two other
psychiatrists, one hired by defense, had already opined that defendants were quite sane);
cf. People v. Hocker, 423 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970) (police failure to make paraffin tests on
alleged murder victim to test defendant's claim that she was a suicide did not make investigation so poor as to deny due process); Lessard v. Dickson, 894 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1968)
(dissent would reverse for failure of prosecution to reveal that motel phone operator had
said murder victim had visitor on day of crime two years before defendant's arrest).
91 United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969), discussed note 89 supra; Hamric v.
Bailey, 886 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967), discussed note 81 supra; Flores v. United States, 379
F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1967).
92 E.g., Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Luna v. Beto, 895 F.2d 35 (5th
Cir. 1968); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968); Hamric v. Bailey, 886 F.2d
390 (4th Cir. 1967).
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that are, in retrospect, difficult to conceive. Courts have so structured
the disclosure requirement through their interpretation of materiality
that when nondisclosure is thought to have been harmless, which often
means only that the court believes the defendant guilty, the legal conclusion is that there has been no error.
This system is inherently unsatisfactory. It provides no clear standard
to which the prosecutor can conform, nor does it ensure that fairness
to the defendant will govern disclosure. Fairness requires that the defendant be given favorable evidence of any probative value on the
questions of guilt or punishment,93 whether relevant to building a defense or to undermining the prosecutor's case. The word "material,"
as used in the Brady holding, should be taken to mean simply "relevant"; and whenever the prosecutor has failed to disclose relevant
information to the defense, the courts should not hesitate to find error.
This does not necessarily mean that a conviction need be reversed when
the prosecutor has innocently overlooked truly insignificant bits of
evidence. When the defendant could not have used the evidence to
advantage either at or in preparation for trial, the court could find the
error harmless and affirm the conviction. But this should be the unusual
case. As the Supreme Court has said, "[b]efore a federal constitutional
error can be held harmless, the Court must be able to declare that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 94 Thus, any slight chance
that the error hampered the defense or that the evidence could have
influenced the jury would be grounds for a new trial.95
In addition to fairness to the defendant, there is another, pragmatic
reason for reversing convictions and remanding for retrial even when
the suppressed evidence seems of minimal value and subsequent events
and other evidence seem to indicate the defendant's guilt conclusively.
93 With the abolition of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
the question of punishment, actually at issue in Brady, has become less significant. The
existence and imposition of the death penalty, and the reluctance of appelate courts to
affirm in cases in which it has been imposed, may well have been the impetus in many
cases for expansive use of the Brady rule. See, e.g., Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.
1963).
94 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); cf. cases cited note 92 supra.
95 It is possible that if the present materiality standard were abandoned, courts would
achieve the same result through use of the harmless error doctrine in all cases in which
they would now find the evidence immaterial. There is, however, a meaningful difference
that could assure some change. Harmless error is better and more tightly defined than
materiality. The doctrine makes dear that the inquiry must be whether it was fair to deny
the defendant the opportunity to have the evidence considered by the jury and not how
that evidence would be weighed by the appellate court. The standard would be closer to
that set in Hamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1970). See note 81 supra. Courts would
presumably be more reluctant to find error harmless than they have been to conclude
that there was no error.
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The remand is a sanction by which to enforce the prosecutor's duty to
disclose. In cases like Mooney98 and Pyle 97 convictions were reversed
because of prosecutorial misconduct that shocked the conscience of the
Court. In subsequent cases, the courts broadened the principle that
originated in Mooney and Pyle; the ground for reversal became materiality and harm to the defendant. 98 This standard has led to expansion of the prosecutor's disclosure duties. As some lower courts have
expanded the meanings of "favorable" and "materiality," it has become
incumbent upon the prosecutor to divulge more and more information
that is less obviously crucial to the defense. Despite Moore, it is now
arguably the duty of the prosecutor to be reasonably alert to defense
as well as prosecution implications of all evidence he uncovers. 9 There
should, however, be some mechanism to enforce this duty that would
not require appellate courts to attempt to make retrospective, and necessarily imperfect, evaluations of the damage after the error of nondisclosure has been committed. This could be accomplished by reversing
convictions whenever the prosecutor fails to comply with the standards
that the courts-and fairness-demand, regardless of the estimated
likelihood that retrial would result in acquittal.'4 °
The manner in which the prosecutor's duty is enforced depends on
the standard of duty imposed. This standard is now defined indirectly
in a number of appellate court decisions that have looked to the
chance, in retrospect, that disclosure would have affected the verdict.
In order to ensure that prosecutors can perform their disclosure duty,
it should be defined directly in terms of what kinds of evidence must
be disclosed and the kinds of decisions that the prosecutor should be
96 294 US. 103 (1985).
97

317 U.S. 213 (1942).

98 Note, supra note 49.
99 Cf. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964).

In addition, the prosecutor must be certain that other officials make required disclosures.
"The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the government."
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Consolidated Laundries
Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961); see text at note 71 supra.
100 Even when a court might conclude that the error was harmless, there is precedent
for the use of the procedure suggested here in the Supreme Court's handling of the analogous problem of illegal search and seizure. After other solutions proved unsatisfactory, the
Court determined that convictions of admittedly guilty defendants must be reversed whenever they were obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 867 US.
643 (1961). The implicit policy decision is that some guilty men must go free in order to
enforce police conformity with constitutional standards of procedure. Although the analogy
is not complete, failure to disclose favorable evidence, like illegal search and seizure, is a
constitutionally forbidden means of pursuing convictions. If a disclosure standard can be
mandated with clarity equal to that for search and seizure, its violation should meet the
same result.
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required, and allowed, to make.10 1 Ideally, perhaps, the defense should
have access to all information in the prosecutor's file that is in any way
relevant or favorable to its case. But so long as the prosecutor is required to recognize that evidence is favorable, there must be some
limit to the chain of inferences he can be expected to make; nor can
he be expected to research or investigate defense aspects of the case
that are unrelated to the investigations he conducts for prosecution
purposes.
At the same time, however, there must be limits on the extent to
which the prosecutor is allowed to make decisions for the defense. If
the prosecutor has or is aware of evidence that he can reasonably be
expected to recognize as useful (that is, favorable)0 2 to the defense, he
should disclose it without attempting to measure the degree to which
it is relevant or favorable. Once he has recognized that evidence has
defense implications, there is no reason to allow the prosecutor to fail
to disclose. It should be the function of the defense, not the prosecutor,
to examine the evidence and to decide what use to make of it at or in
preparation for trial.
Any duty to disclose information is, of course, a departure from the
prosecutor's traditional adversary role, and any expansion of that duty
would require a further departure. While the specter of the destruction of the adversary system is invariably raised in opposition to any
proposal for expanded criminal discovery,103 it is clear that, at least
since Brady, we no longer have a purely adversary system 0 4 and it is
useful to consider the extent to which it should be preserved. The
major justification of the adversary system is that, allegedly, it develops
the facts better than any alternative. When it is found, however, that
it impedes the development of the facts, perhaps it should be modified.
The prosecutor remains an adversary to the extent that it is his job
to prove that the defendant is guilty of the crime with which he has
been charged. But he is an adversary whose client is the state or federal
government, and as such, his "interest in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done."'' 0 5 The prose101 See note 48 supra.
102 For further discussion of favorableness versus utility, see text at notes 108-35 infra.
103 See Louisel, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent, 49 CAr.w. L. REv. 56
(1961).
o10See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 US. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum,
237 Us. 309 (1915).
105 Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); accord, Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 100
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring): "The state's pursuit is justice, not a victim." See generally
Editorial Note, Discovery and Disclosure:Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor'sRole in Criminal
Procedure, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 92 (1965).
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cutor, therefore, has two roles: first to discover the facts of the crime
and then, once convinced of the defendant's guilt, to attempt to prove
it to the trier of fact and to argue the position of the state as to matters
of law. It is only in the latter role that the prosecutor must be an advocate. There is, however, inevitable tension between these two roles.
The prosecutor's investigations will usually be designed to prepare for
trial, and the prosecutor may often be convinced of the defendant's
guilt long before the trial begins. 0 6 Any attempt, therefore, to encourage the prosecutor to fulfill his duty to disclose evidence with regard
to defense objectives must recognize the pressures that predispose him
toward his adversary role. Perhaps the most effective means of accomplishing this is to reverse the "victory" of conviction whenever the
prosecutor has neglected his duty to ensure fairness to the accused.0 7
IV.

WHY NOT OPEN FiLxs?

But for the requirement of the Brady holding that the evidence be
favorable to the accused, the argument for expansion would extend to
disclosure of the prosecutor's entire file. Yet in light of the fairness rationale in Brady, the distinction between favorable and unfavorable
evidence is, in fact, artificial. For the defendant to prepare adequately
to meet the government's case against him, he must know what that
case is. The chance to question even hostile witnesses before trial, and
through them to seek leads to other, more favorable, witnesses could be
crucial. A defendant who knows that he must confront an essentially
circumstantial case may be able to concentrate on proving that the cir106 Prosecution is the goal towards which an investigation points: by the time the prose-

cutor enters the case, that goal has generally become the prosecution of a specific individual or group of individuals. While the prosecutor's stake in a trial is by no means as great
as the defendant's, he may well be concerned about his professional reputation and career
advancement. Moreover, it is difficult for an individual who has made the decision to prose-

cute, and is therefore likely to be personally convinced of the defendant's guilt, to maintain the presumption of innocence. This combination of personal and psychological factors
may often make the prosecutor dismiss as unimportant evidence that he would be extremely
eager to have as a defense attorney. E.g., United States v. Achtenberg, 459 F.2d-91 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 229 (1972), in which the prosecutor dismissed as "negative evidence"

and refused to disclose eyewitnesses' statements that they had not seen the defendant participate in the crime. The conviction was reversed for this and other errors. Cf. Xydas v.
United States, 445 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971), in which after a
defense request, an in camera inspection by the court confirmed the prosecutor's denial
that he had favorable evidence. When the defense discovered a possibly exculpatory statement and appealed, the conviction was affirmed on a finding that the statement would not
have created reasonable doubt.

107 Contempt penalties are a possible alternative but would be unduly harsh in all but
the most flagrant cases and completely inappropriate in the ordinary case of negligent nondisclosure.
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cumstances suggest an alternative explanation. Any defendant who is
aware of the nature of the case against him will be better able to use
his own resources to prepare his defense.
Superior preparation gives the prosecution the advantage of surprise' 08 and the ability to make a smoother presentation to the jury.
These tactical advantages, however intangible, are real, and difficult to
justify. Like suppression, they may help "shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant."'019 Removing them would help place the
parties on a more nearly equal footing in terms of preparation and
thus promote the fairness of the trial.
In addition to its consistency with the constitutional rationale of
Brady and the other suppression cases, other policy considerations favor
full disclosure. Open files would, of course, remove the burden on the
prosecutor of attempting to determine whether evidence is favorable
and allow the defense attorney to decide what evidence will help his
case. 110 It would thus greatly simplify the prosecutor's task of fulfilling
his disclosure duty; he would have a straightforward standard to follow, known in advance, with a clear sanction for its breach."' A rule
of full disclosure would, therefore, lighten the burden that enforcement places on the courts, reducing the flood of discovery appeals that
112
the courts have experienced under Brady.
At the same time, it is likely that the advent of an open files requirement would not drastically change the reality of modern pretrial criminal practice. A great deal more informal discovery goes on than that
required either by the Brady rule, the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro108 It is the innocent defendant who is most subject to being surprised by the prosecution.
109 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963).

110 See note 48 supra.
111 That some, more straightforward standard is necessary is indicated by the remarks
of the former United States Attorney for Connecticut Jon Newman, Panel DiscussionDiscovery in Criminal Cases, supra note 22, at 500-01, in which he recounts having posed

to a large gathering of prosecutors, experienced and inexperienced, the typical Brady
hypothetical of the one eyewitness among several who states that the defendant is not the
man. When Newman asked whether this should be disclosed to the defense, only two of
the prosecutors said yes.
112 At the same time, however, it would be neither a foolproof check on deliberate
nondisclosure nor a complete answer to negligent nondisclosure, although it would greatly
ameliorate both problems. The former must be assumed to be minimal. But see Miller v.
Pate, 386 US. 1 (1967). There could be no procedural mechanism that would prevent a

determined prosecutor from falsifying or suppressing evidence or profferring perjured testimony. A requirement of open files would no doubt deter such behavior since it would

make more difficult any claim of mere negligence. Negligent nondisclosure would still
be
possible: not every statement made to a law enforcement agent finds its way into the
prosecutor's files; but it seems likely that it would be less common.
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cedure, or state standards. 113 The prosecutor allows such discovery at
his discretion, partially, perhaps, in recognition of his duty to inform
the defense of favorable evidence, but mainly in an attempt to induce
guilty pleas. In line with the present trend to encourage and protect
plea bargaining, 114 it would seem that the defendant should be fully
informed of the case against him in order to promote intelligent
choice. Under the present system, prosecutors willingly disclose their
cases to defendants who are almost certain to be convicted, but the
courts refuse to compel similar disclosure to defendants whose probability of acquittal is high. The equal protection problem inherent in
the current practice"15 would also be resolved by the suggested change
to open files.
The traditional arguments against any form of expanded discovery
rights for criminal defendants" 6 would almost certainly be raised
against the proposed full disclosure requirement. Aside from the threat
to the adversary system discussed above," 7 there are three main objections: (1) the scales are already unbalanced in favor of the defendant;
(2) the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination makes
disclosure a one-way street, which is unfair to the prosecution; and
(3) disclosure would enable defendants more readily to commit perjury, tamper with documents and real evidence, and intimidate prosecution witnesses. 118
Although the defense has increasingly been required to plead the
defenses of insanity and alibi specially before trial," 9 the basic defense
advantages of avoiding self-incrimination and the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard remain intact. They exist, however, as a deliberate
113 See, e.g., Brennan, J., supra note 1, at 282; Newman, Memo to all Assistant U.S.
Attorneys for the District of Connecticut in L. WEINREB, Criminal Process: Cases, Com-

ments and Questions 565 (1969).
114 See Santo Bello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
115 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 282: "Apart from the constitutional overtones of denial

of equal protection involved in such a practice, I think we must all agree that the opportunity for discovery on equal terms should either be the right of all accused, or the right
of none."
116 See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L. Hand, J.); State v.
Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A-2d 881 (1953) (Vanderbilt, C.J.). See generally Louisell, supra note
103.

117 See text at notes 103-05 supra.
118 See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). But see Brennan,

J.,

supra note 1; Goldstein, supra note 1.
119 Brennan, J., supra note 1, at 283; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1186; cf. Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure,52 F.R.D. 409 (1971) (rules 12.1 and 12.2 would impose these
requirements in federal courts). On California's experience, see Fletcher, PretrialDisclosure
in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293, 315 (1960).
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common law and constitutional attempt to protect persons charged with
crimes. To undermine these protections by weighting the scales against
the accused in pretrial procedure as a counterbalance seems misguided.
Moreover, it forces the defendant to pay a high price for the privilege
of silence whether or not he exercises it.
The one-way street argument is also based on the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination. According to this argument,
defense discovery would put the prosecution at a disadvantage since the
fifth amendment would prevent it from obtaining discovery against
the defendant. 120 In fact, however, the prosecutor's vast investigative
resources, particularly his ability to use the grand jury as a tool to
question witnesses before the defendant even knows he has been accused
121
of a crime, and police interrogation, despite the Miranda rule, give
him almost complete access to the defense's case. And insofar as the
fifth amendment does place limitations on the prosecutor's ability to
discover evidence, the response to the first argument applies.
The perjury and witness-tampering argument is more serious. It is
possible that some guilty defendants with access to the prosecution's
case will be better able to concoct a plausible but fraudulent defense.
Even without discovery, however, the defendant can always try to get
false alibi witnesses. Most authorities reject the argument of "the old
hobgoblin, perjury, invariably raised with every suggested change in
procedure to make easier the discovery of truth... ."122 The somewhat

parallel experience of the civil128law with expanded discovery should
also serve to allay perjury fears.
120

See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). But see State v. Johnson, 28 N.J.

133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 933 (1961). See generally Brennan, supra
note 1, at 289, 292-93.
121 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
122 Brennan, supra note 1, at 291, (also pointing out that the argument may be regarded

as slander against the criminal defense bar, who, rather than defendant directly, would
have access to the evidence); 6 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940), remarking
that the same argument was the basis "for the one-time refusal of the criminal law...
to allow the accused to produce any witnesses at all."; cf. 4 J. MoorE, FEDRa.L PRaancE
§ 26.02(2) (3d ed. 1962).
123 See Speck, The Use of Discovery in U.S. District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1154
(1951): "[The consensus among lawyers is to reject it [the perjury argument]. This investigation disclosed the variety of ways in which lawyers use discovery to thwart perjury."

Inherent in the perjury argument is an assumption directly counter to the presumption
of innocence or, at least, counter to any notion that the presumption is applicable before
trial. It assumes that the defendant is guilty and will therefore use his access to the prosecutor's case to avoid his just punishment. It is, of course, mainly the guilty defendant from
whom we fear perjury and witness intimidation. For the presumably innocent defendant,
the purpose of open files would be to point him in the right direction to gather evidence
for his defense.
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Without empirical data to test the validity of the fears raised in the
antidiscovery arguments, they are more appropriately directed to the
need for a check on any right of the defendant to see the prosecutor's
file in special cases involving unusual risks of witness intimidation. 124
Rather than deny full discovery universally because of the risks it
would entail in unusual cases, it seems sensible to view disclosure as
a right that can be regulated, in cases of special need, by a protective
order analogous to that provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.125 To obtain a protective order, the prosecutor could be required to make a particularized showing that there is reason to fear
witness tampering or other abuse of discovery, which the trial judge
26
could then weigh against the defendant's right.
Several common law jurisdictions have greatly expanded the duty
of the prosecutor to disclose evidence to the defense and, apparently,
have done so successfully. Although some authorities have contended
that the English experience cannot be taken as indicating the effects
of criminal discovery in this country,12 7 the absence there of the dangers
that discovery is often thought to entail at least suggests that such fears
may be exaggerated.128 Similarly, although Vermont cannot be taken
as a microcosm of America, the success of that state's open file system 29
indicates that the risks of full disclosure may be small. Finally, there
has been no evidence that the considerable expansion of the defendant's discovery rights in some states'8 0 and in the federal courts under
124 Brennan, supra note 1, at 294-95; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1195; Louissell, supra
note 103, at 98-101. There would also be need for a work-product exception modeled after
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See Note, Work Product in Criminal Discovery,
1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 321; PreliminaryDraft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 48 F.R.D. 547, 590 (1970) (rule 16(a)(2)).
125 FED. L Crv. P. 26(c).
126 For an example of such a balancing problem where disclosure of the identity of an
informer was denied, with the dissent citing Brady, see United States v. Russ, 362 F.2d 843
(2d Cir. 1966).
127 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 219, 98 A.2d 881, 889 (1953).
128 See Brennan, J., supra note 1, at 284, 293, stating that Great Britain and Canada
require that the defense be given notice of all evidence to be used against it at trial at the
preliminary hearing. But see Louisell, supra note 103, at 66: "[T]here could be much
information which the defendant might need for proper preparation of his defense which
would not be disclosed to him by this machinery, either because it is withheld by the
prosecutor as not admissable, or because, though admissable, it is evidence which the
prosecutor does not intend to offer at trial."
129 See generally, Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J.
732 (1967).
130 For discussions of California's experience in expanding discovery, see Traynor,
supra note 61, and Louisell, supra note 103; cf. Comment, Discovery in California Criminal
Cases: Its Importance and its Pitfalls, 38 S.CAL. L. REv. 251 (1965).
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Brady and the federal rules 31 has led to any of the problems that have
been imagined for an open file system.
The rationale that underlay Brady and the lower federal court cases
that have expanded it also justifies, carried to its logical conclusion,
complete disclosure of the prosecutor's file to the defendant as a
matter of constitutional right. This does not mean, however, that this
change can be wrought only by a court holding that due process compels it. The prosecutor's files could be opened to the defense by an
act of Congress 13 2 or by amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 138 Since it relates directly to the trial function, discovery should
probably remain in the hands of courts, which will have to deal on a
case-by-case basis with whatever problems may arise.13 4 Effecting the
change by amending the federal rules would allow relatively easy resolution of whatever problems result by means of further amendment.
Universal application of an open file requirement in both state and
federal courts, however, could only be achieved by a Supreme Court
decision that due process compels full disclosure.
In light of the Court's action in Moore,3 5 such a decision seems unlikely. Nonetheless, full disclosure is both desirable and consistent with
the fair trial rationale of Brady. It could logically be wrought through
Supreme Court extension of lower court case law under Brady and of
the principles of that case.
Victor Bass
131 FE. R. Cam. P. 16, 17(c).
132 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 8500 (1970) (Jencks Act).
183 Cf. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, supra note 124, at 587 (rule 16).
134 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 293-94.
135 Moore v. Illinois, 408 US. 786 (1972); see text at notes 73-78 supra.

